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1. Introduction 
During the last century, large increases in real per-capita income have occurred in 
the currently high-income countries. Research and Development (R&D) has been 
the source of improvements in existing goods and the introduction of new goods. 
Only recently has the full importance of successful new goods to economic 
growth been discovered (Hausman, 1996; Boskin et al., 1998). Not all seemingly 
useful new goods, however, have been adopted. For example, genetically 
modified (GM) foods have been engulfed in considerable controversy, and the 
early optimism about GM foods has been dampened. Information issues are 
central to the GM-food debate. Furthermore, it is important to understand the 
reaction in developed countries to GM-foods, because they set the tone of the 
world market in grains, oilseeds, and animal products. 
In our history, other useful new goods have been adopted slowly. They 
include pasteurization of milk a century ago, nuclear power starting fifty years 
ago, and irradiated meat and poultry over the past decade. In the United States, 
early opposition to the pasteurization of milk was widespread, with opponents 
saying, among other things, that pasteurization was not needed and that 
consumers had the ‘right to drink raw milk’ (Hotchkiss, 2001). Pirtle (1926) notes 
that the slow adoption of pasteurization resulted in thousands of deaths that could 
have been prevented at a very low social cost.  
The early prospects for nuclear power were good, but major and persistent 
resistance developed in Europe and the United States to electricity generated by 
nuclear power (Grübler, 1996). Although nuclear power is relatively cheap to 
produce and low in traditional environmental pollutants (e.g., CO2, nitrous oxides, 
and sulfur oxides), environmental groups like Greenpeace and Friends of the 
Earth have lobbied and demonstrated against using the technology. Ruttan (2001) 
indicates that these groups helped increase the public’s risk perception of nuclear 
power in the United States, forcing stringent safety standards to be enacted that 
contributed to a quadrupling of plant costs in just less than a decade. Thus no new 
nuclear power plants have been ordered in the United States since 1978. The 
image problems of nuclear power have carried over to irradiated foods during the 
past decade. Although irradiation of meat and poultry essentially eliminates all 
harmful-to-human-health bacteria like E-coli and salmonella, it has encountered 
stiff resistance (Nestle, 2002; Fox, 2002). Failing to irradiate meat and poultry has 
resulted in a significant number of annual deaths that were preventable at small 
marginal social cost.  
In 1973, Cohen and Boyer discovered the technique of recombinant DNA 
(rDNA). The Cohen-Boyer patent for gene-splicing technology was awarded in 
1980, which enabled the “Gene Revolution” starting in the 1990s (OTA, 1989). 
Early optimism existed in the United States, Canada, Argentina, and even in the 
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European Union (Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride, 2002). Furthermore, the 
agricultural biotech industry, (e.g., Monsanto and Syngenta), has promoted 
strongly GM-technology and foods, and has lobbied against labeling (CBI, 2001). 
In Europe, when food concerns unrelated to genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) arose in the late 1990s, the green party leaders and the organic farmers 
demonstrated and lobbied against GMOs. They have been vocal opponents of 
agricultural biotechnology, creating websites, holding protests, issuing press 
releases, and burning down field trials of new GM crops. One argument they have 
made is that ‘customers must have the right to know’ what foods are genetically 
modified (Greenpeace, 1997, 2001; Friends of the Earth, 2001). Another 
argument is to pursue the International ‘precautionary principle,’ which 
emphasizes potential future unknown harmful effects but ignores current real 
benefits that currently would occur to producers and others (Paarlberg, 2001; 
Johnson, 2002). The European Union has been swayed by these arguments 
(Hoban, 1998; Paarlberg, 2001). In 1997, the European Union established a 
policy requiring the labeling of GM-foods. The next year, they imposed a 
temporary moratorium on the registration of new GM crop varieties for release to 
farmers. In September 2003, the European Union passed new legislation that 
imposed traceability and labeling requirements on GMOs, and food and feed 
products were to be regulated (European Parliament and Council, 2003)  
The GM-food debate is engulfed in information issues—labeling and 
asymmetric information. The labeling issue encompasses the effects on consumer 
demand (and agricultural biotech companies) of ‘plain labels,’ which are silent 
about potential GM content; labels stating that a food contains GM organisms or 
that food is GM-free, which is interpreted to mean that a food has minimal or no 
GM content (i.e., it does not exceed an agreed-upon threshold, such as 1 percent 
or 5 percent impurity). Asymmetric information is central to the GM-controversy. 
Interested parties, such as the biotech industry (e.g., Monsanto, Syngenta), and 
international environmental groups (e.g., Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and 
Action Aid), disseminate GM information through various media that promote 
their particular private interests. Consumers and farmers, however, are exposed to 
the information of interested parties as the interested parties make purchasing 
decisions. 
The consequences of new technologies and new products can be great, 
affecting the welfare of current and future generations. This article examines the 
effects of diverse information on the probability that consumers are out of the 
market for GM foods and places the emphasis on information from environmental 
groups, and on a third-party source (Huffman and Tegene, 2002; Huffman et al., 
2003). For this study, we collected unique data from adult consumers in the 
United States who participated in laboratory auctions of three food types that had 
randomly assigned labeling and information treatments. Our key findings are that 
when consumers are treated to environmental-group perspectives of GMOs, it 
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increases the probability that they are out of the market for GM foods. Third 
party, verifiable information, dampens the effectiveness on consumers of the 
environmental-group perspective. An important finding is that negative 
information on GM foods from environmental groups, an interested source, can 
stymie technology adoption.  
2. Data 
We used data from the experiments described in Huffman et al. (2003). We now 
briefly highlight the main elements of our design. Consumers might react 
differently to GM content in different types of food or they might dislike some 
food products. Therefore using only one food item in a laboratory auction seemed 
unlikely to reveal enough information, given the sizeable fixed cost of conducting 
the experiment. Three food items were chosen for our willingness to pay (WTP) 
auctions: vegetable oil (made from soybeans), tortilla chips (made from yellow 
corn), and russet potatoes. In the distilling and refining process for vegetable oils, 
essentially all of the proteins (which are the components of DNA and the source 
of genetic modification) are removed leaving pure lipids. Minimal human health 
concerns should arise from GM oil, but consumers may worry that either the GM 
soybeans affect the environment or the GM soybeans are inadequately distilled. 
Tortilla chips are highly processed foods that may be made from GM or non-GM 
corn, and consumers might have human health and environmental concerns about 
this product. Russet potatoes are purchased as a fresh product and are generally 
fried or baked before eating. Similar to tortilla chips, consumers might see both 
human health and environmental risks from eating GM-russet potatoes. 
We are interested in the effects of diverse information, given labeling, on 
consumer demand for food products that might be genetically modified. In our 
experiments, the two labels—GM and plain—were clearly displayed on the fronts 
of each food package (Huffman et al., 2003). A one-page summary organized 
under five different headings—general information, scientific information, human 
impact, financial impact, and environmental impact was prepared, with pro-GM 
information from Monsanto and Syngenta, which are large agribusiness 
companies; anti-GM information was provided by Greenpeace, a leading 
environmental group and non governmental organization (NGO), which opposes 
genetic modification; and third-party or verifiable information from informed but 
financially disinterested sources. The exact information disseminated can be 
found in Huffman et al. (2003) or can be obtained by the authors upon request. 
This information was organized into six information treatments: pro-GM, anti-
GM, pro-GM and anti-GM, pro-GM and verifiable, anti-GM and verifiable, and 
all three types. The six information treatments were randomly assigned to 12 
experimental units, with each unit consisting of 12 to 16 individuals. 
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We followed standard experimental auction-valuation procedures (Smith, 
1976; Shogren et al., 1994), with refinements to the design to better reflect 
consumer purchases.  First, our subjects submitted only one bid per product to 
avoid any question of creating affiliated values that can affect the demand-
revealing nature of a Vickrey-style auction (List and Shogren, 1999). Second, 
endowment effects were minimized by not endowing our subjects with a food 
item and then asking them to ‘upgrade’ to another food item, because that 
methodology can cause distorted bid prices (Lusk and Schroeder, 2002). Third, 
consumers bid on three unrelated food items: vegetable oil, corn chips and russet 
potatoes—so we obtained useful information on their tastes for genetic 
modification even if a subject disliked one or two products. Fourth, treatments 
were assigned randomly to experimental units, and the estimation of treatment 
effects was simply the difference in means across treatments (Wooldridge, 2002). 
We also randomized within treatments (e.g., order of pro- and anti-biotech 
information when an experimental unit received both types). Third party, 
verifiable information was always presented last. 
Fifth, adult consumers over 18 years of age from two large metropolitan 
areas in the United States were chosen as participants by a random digit-dialing 
method (Table 1 for summary statistics).1  Subjects were paid a participation fee 
of $40. We used common food items available to shoppers in grocery stores and 
supermarkets, and preferred adults who were not primarily college students. (A 
sample primarily of grocery store shoppers also weakens the sometimes-stated 
need for having students participate in several rounds of bidding to stabilize bids 
for food items.) Table 1 contains sample mean values of the adults who 
participated in our experiments. The concentration of women reflects women’s 
greater involvement in households’ decisions on food and household products. 
Also, using individuals chosen randomly minimizes the chance that participants 
change their behavior only because they are participants in an experiment with 
specific objectives, i.e., it minimizes the Hawthorne effect (Melton et al. 1996). 
Sixth, a Vickrey 2nd price auction is used frequently in WTP experiments, 
but it does not engage ‘off the margin bidders.’ For new products, researchers are 
interested in the location of the completed demand curve—not just one segment 
of it. We used the random nth price auction, which has the advantage that it is 
demand revealing in theory, and the auction attempts to engage bidders at all 
locations along the demand curve (Shogren et al., 2001). For example, each of k 
bidders submits a bid for one unit of a good; for instance, if the monitor randomly 
selects n = 4 <= k, the four highest bidders each purchase one unit of the good 
priced at the fourth-highest bid. This random nth price auction increases the odds 
that insincere bidding will lead to a loss. Consumers, who ‘won’ the auction, 
purchased the products. 
                                                 
1  See Huffman et al. (2003) for means of attributes of survey areas. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the Auction Participants (N=172) 
Variable Definition Mean St. Dev.
Gender 1 if female 0.62 0.49
Age The participant’s age 49.50 17.50
Married 1 if the individual is married 0.67 0.47
Education Years of schooling 14.54 2.25
Household Number of people in participant’s household 2.78 1.65
Income The household’s income level (in thousands) 57.00 32.60
White 1 if participant is white 0.90 0.30
Informeda 
1 if an individual considered him/herself at 
least somewhat informed regarding GM foods 0.42 0.49
Labels1 
1 if the treatment bid on foods with GM labels 
in Round 1 0.52 0.50
aInformation about participant’s prior beliefs; information collected from participants in 
pre-auction questionnaire. 
Source: Adapted from Huffman et al. (2003:490). 
 
 
Finally, information from our laboratory experiments is complemented by 
information obtained from pre- and post-experiment questionnaires administered 
to participants. The pre-auction survey allowed us to obtain socio-demographic 
information and information on participants’ beliefs about GM and other 
technologies before treatment, which is useful to help explain bidder behavior. 
The post-auction questionnaire allowed us to obtain information from participants 
about sources they would trust to provide verifiable information, a concept 
introduced in the experiment. 
3. A Model 
The model is one of a consumer demand function in which demand is determined 
by the physical attributes of the food item, the GM-content (as labeled), 
information (agricultural biotech industry, environmental, and/or third party), and 
socio-economic attributes of the shopper and his or her household. The hypothesis 
is that the environmental-group perspective on genetic modification shifts a 
consumer’s demand curve to the left or downwardly and verifiable information 
shifts the demand curve to the right or upwardly. If demand is reduced 
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sufficiently, grocery store managers will not stock a product. We define two tests 
for being ‘out of the market’ for a GM-food item. The strong test assumes that a 
consumer is out of the market for a GM-food when he or she bids zero for the GM 
food item (when he or she bids a positive amount for the plain-labeled 
counterpart). The weak test assumes that a consumer is out of the market for a 
GM-food when he or she reduces his or her bid by at least one-third relative to 
their bid for a similar plain-labeled product. Given that marking margins are 
generally less than 20 percent (Kiesel, Buschena, and Smith, 2002) a 33 percent 
or larger reduction in willingness to pay would most likely mean that grocery 
store managers would not stock a product.  
The key hypotheses are: (1) when the environmental group perspective on 
genetic modification is released to consumers, it increases the probability that 
consumers are out of the market for GM-labeled foods; and (2) given that the 
consumers have received the environmental-group perspective on GMOs, the 
release of third-party, verifiable information dampens the effects of 
environmental group information on consumers, and thereby makes consumers 
less likely to be out of the market for GM foods. 
The empirical evidence we are looking for is contained in descriptive 
statistics of experimental results and Probit models explaining the probability of a 
consumer being out of the market for GM-labeled foods (Wooldridge, 2002). 
4. Results 
First, we consider the percentage of consumers who are out of the market for the 
GM-labeled products (Table 2). Part A of Table 2 shows the results for the strong 
test, examining the percentage of consumers who bid zero for the GM-labeled 
food items. The percentage of consumers who are out of the market for an item 
using the strong test ranges from 8.9 percent for vegetable oil to 12.9 percent for 
tortilla chips. Part B shows the results for the weak test, examining the percentage 
of consumers who discounted their bids for the GM-labeled food items by at least 
one-third relative to their bids for the plain-labeled items. The percentage of 
consumers who are out of the market for an item using the weak test ranges from 
19.2 percent for vegetable oil to 23.9 percent for tortilla chips.  
Tables 3 and 4 present results from fitting Probit models explaining the 
probability of laboratory participants being out of the market for GM-labeled food 
items given particular information treatments. In Table 3, the dependent variable 
takes a “1” if the participant is out of the market for a GM-labeled food item via 
the strong test (i.e., bids zero for the GM-labeled food item while bidding some 
positive amount for a plain-labeled counterpart), and a “0” otherwise. In Table 4, 
the dependent variable takes a “1” if a participant is out of the market for a GM- 
food item (i.e., has reduced his or her bid by at least one-third relative to the 
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Table 2. Percentage of Consumers Who are Out of the Market for GM-Labeled 
Food Items: Excludes Double-Zero Bids 
 
Part A: Percentage of Consumers who Bid Zero  
for a GM-Labeled Food Item 
 Observations Out of Market
Percent Out of 
Market
Vegetable Oil only 146 13 8.9
Tortilla Chips only 155 20 12.9
Potatoes only 159 20 12.6
Part B: Percentage of Consumers Whose Bid for a GM-Labeled Food Item 
is 2/3’s the Amount They Bid for the Plain-Labeled Food Item, or Lower 
 Observations Out of Market
Percent Out of 
Market
   Vegetable Oil only 146 28 19.2
   Tortilla Chips only 155 37 23.9
   Potatoes only 159 35 22.0
Source: Authors’ Calculations. 
 
 
plain-labeled item), and a “0” otherwise. Both tables show separate results for the 
bottle of vegetable oil, the bag of potatoes, and the bag of tortilla chips.  
The estimated coefficients from Probit models fitted to our sample of 
laboratory participants explains the probability that an auction participant is out of 
the market for a food item. The results show that release of the environmental-
group perspective on genetic modification in the experiment increases the 
probability that a participant is out of the market for each of the three GM-food 
items. The impact is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for the tortilla 
chips using the strong test and for russet potatoes and vegetable oil using the 
weak test. This result has important implications. If an international 
environmental NGO wishes to slow scientific progress or reduce trade, it could 
disseminate large amounts of negative information, even if the information is 
highly biased. With asymmetric information, it could even disguise true intentions 
by telling consumers it wants to keep them “fully informed” of the consequences 
of a product or technology, or by telling consumers to be very cautious until all 
the negative claims are disproved, hence the “precautionary principle.” Even if 
individuals do not fully believe the information, negative GM information will 
increase the uncertainty about products that might be genetically modified or 
about processes using genetic modification, and which have been shown to 
decrease the likelihood of adoption(Purvis et al., 1995). With a significant 
reduction in consumer demand, supermarket managers may discontinue carrying 
an item, which reduces consumers’ choices, and with a collapse in the market for 
a food item, farmers would discontinue using GM-technology to produce the raw 
products needed for particular foods. Given that technological change is one of 
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Table 3. Probit Model: Dependent Variable is 1 if a Consumer Bids Zero for the 
GM-Labeled-Product and 0 Otherwise (N=172, Standard Errors in Parenthesis)a 
 Food Item 
Regressors Vegetable Oil Russet Potatoes Tortilla Chips
Environmental Perspective 0.836 0.623 0.874**
 (0.52) (0.44) (0.43) 
Biotech Industry Perspective –0.383 –0.604* –0.321 
 (0.36) (0.33) (0.32) 
Third-Party Perspective –0.036 –0.234 –0.475 
 (0.327) (0.29) (0.30) 
Household Income 0.002 –0.002 0.006 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Labeled GM1st Round 0.772** 0.565* 0.582* 
 (0.38) (0.32) (0.06) 
Informed Before Trials 0.107 .0439 0.107 
 (0.34) (0.30) (0.30) 
Intercept –2.499** –1.916** –2.196**
  (0.76) (0.63) (0.61) 
a Each commodity is considered separately and the parameters of each Probit model are 
estimating using maximum likelihood estimation. 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
Source: Authors’ compilations. 
 
 
the driving forces behind the escalating standards of living, stalling adoption of 
new goods broadly could lead to a significant reduction in future social welfare. 
The results reported in Tables 3 and 4 also show that when the third-party 
perspective is released in the experiment after participants have received the 
environmental-group perspective, it decreases significantly, at the 5 percent level, 
the probability that participants are out of the market for GM-labeled foods. The 
impact is statistically significant for two of the three food items using the weak 
test. This result provides evidence that a third-party perspective, which provides 
neutral but verifiable information on genetic modification and GM-foods can 
significantly reduce the probability that markets for GM-foods collapse.2 In 
addition to the value verifiable information has by providing consumers with 
                                                 
2 Johnson et al. (2001) find that consumers trusted environmental groups more than some third-
party (e.g., government) sources. We were careful to separate our discussion of third-party 
information from government sources of information. 
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Table 4. Probit Model: Dependent Variable is 1 if a Consumer Bids at Least One-
Third Less For a GM-Labeled Product than Plain Labeled Product and 0 Otherwise 
(N=172, Standard Errors In Parenthesis)a 
 Food Item 
Regressors Vegetable Oil Russet Potatoes Tortilla Chips
Environmental Perspective 0.864** 0.820** 0.460 
 (0.37) (0.38) (0.31) 
Biotech Industry Perspective –0.359 –0.694** –0.489* 
 (0.30) (0.28) (0.28) 
Third-Party Perspective –0.691** –0.714** –0.186 
 (0.28) (0.26) (0.24) 
Household Income 0.004 –0.001 0.005 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Labeled GM1st Round –0.143 –0.014 –0.117 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.25) 
Informed Before Trials 0.493 .0654** 0.447* 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.25) 
Intercept –1.378** –0.962* –1.057**
  (0.52) (0.63) (0.46) 
a Each commodity is considered separately and the parameters of each Probit model are 
estimating using maximum likelihood estimation. 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
Source: Authors’ compilations. 
 
 
objective information on the risks and benefits of genetic modification (estimated 
in Rousu et al. (2002) at U.S. $2.6 billion), verifiable information can increase the 
number of real options that consumers have in supermarkets. 
When the biotech industry perspective in the experiment is released, the 
probability of a participant being out of the market for a GM-labeled food product 
is reduced, which is statistically significant for one of the three food items using 
the strong test and two of the three food items using the weak test (Tables 3 and 
4). Although the agricultural biotech industry perspective frequently gets bad 
press, our results suggest that it can also reduce the probability of consumers 
being out of the market for GM-labeled foods. In addition, consumer pre-
experiment beliefs are important factors for understanding the demand for GM-
labeled foods. When a participant reported in our pre-experiment questionnaire 
that he or she was at ‘least somewhat informed’ about GM-technology and 
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products, he or she had a significantly higher probability of being out of the 
market for GM-foods (Table 4).3 
5. Conclusions and Implications 
This article has provided new insights into and empirical evidence on factors 
affecting resistance to new products by consumers in a high-income country. Our 
evidence is derived from a unique data set. We applied a sound statistical 
experimental design that randomly assigned labeling and information treatments 
to experimental units of adult consumers who participated in laboratory auction 
experiments of three food items that might be genetically modified.  
We uncovered several useful results. First, we showed that bids by the 
participants for food items are affected in plausible ways by the release of diverse 
information. Furthermore, no single perspective is a dominating source covering 
up the effects of other perspectives. Second, when participants bid on foods with 
GM labels, they were significantly more likely to be out of the market. Third, 
when participants received the environmental group perspective, they had a 
significantly higher probability of being out of the market for GM-labeled food 
items. Fourth, given that the environmental-group perspective was released, the 
release of third party, verifiable information dissipated most of the negative effect 
of the environmental group perspective on participants. Verifiable information 
can be an effective policy tool used to moderate resistance to new products and to 
keep new food products as options in supermarkets, thereby increasing 
consumers’ range of choices. 
Our results present an alternative explanation for negligible demand by the 
Europeans for GM foods. Europeans may have a strong preference for a natural or 
traditional production process, and this preference causes them to resist GMOs 
(Zechendorf, 1998). An alternative interpretation is that NGOs, largely 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, have been more prevalent in Europe than 
they have been in the United States, disseminating larger amounts of negative 
GM-information, creating skepticism and doubt about GM technology.  
                                                 
3  An individual’s household income, education, gender, or age do not have a statistically 
significant effect on the probability of a participant being out of the market for any of the GM-
food products. 
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